Mr Luke Charters

Mr Luke Charters

Labour — York Outer

Speaking in the House of Commons on 17 November 2026

Debate

The Economy: Impact of Hostile State Activity

Contribution

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Allin-Khan. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) for securing this debate. I believe that in the decades ahead, when scholars write about Britain’s readiness for conflict, they will think of the contributions he has made in this place and no doubt of the phrase he has coined, the “Putin tax.” From the outset, I will be clear that I think we are discussing three types of hostile nation state activity today. First, of course, there is the most egregious form, in which a nation state actor directly targets Britain; the second is where a hostile nation state sponsors a non-state actor; and, thirdly, there is cyber-crime, which I will focus on. Cyber-crime is an area I know well; my University of Chicago adviser, Professor Bob Pape, has written extensively about it. It is where a non-state actor operates in effectively a laissez-faire environment, whereby a nation state provides sanctuary or tolerates funding of, or recruitment by, international cyber-crime groups, or simply declines to act in the face of such groups. In the academic literature, that is called “passive sponsorship”, and we must focus on that. Therefore, we must also pay close attention to what I term the dandelion effect, whereby hostile nation states train international cyber-criminals, who then operate freely in cell-like structures. Moving on from this definitional pause, that is exactly where I will focus my remarks today. When I was a member of the Public Accounts Committee, I was one of the lead members on an inquiry into cyber-resilience. A striking case was the chilling ransomware attack on Synnovis, which I believe you will know something about as well, Dr Allin-Khan. Synnovis is the NHS blood testing supplier for Guy’s and St Thomas’, the hospital just over the road from Parliament. Blood and specimen testing was disrupted, and more than 11,000 appointments were missed. That had a knock-on effect on blood cross-matching, leading to an urgent appeal for type O blood donations. In fact, I was struck by the comment by my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar that there must have been a cost, but we did not know what it was. In the case of Synnovis, the cost may have well been a human life. A key lesson from the Synnovis case is that hostile state and non-state actors will increasingly target public supply chains. Nothing is off limits, especially the health and safety of our constituents, and those state and non-state actors will always seek the lowest common denominator of vulnerability in the supply chain. That is the area that I will turn to next. I was a Parliamentary Private Secretary in the Department for Business and Trade when it had the challenging job of working with MPs whose constituents had been impacted by the Jaguar Land Rover cyber-attack, in particular tier 2, tier 3 and tier 4 manufacturers. The Cyber Monitoring Centre said that attack cost the British economy between £1.6 billion and £2.1 billion—it even showed up in Bank of England forecasts—and called it the most expensive in British history “by some distance.” I note with interest the comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), the former Minister for the Armed Forces, who is here in Westminster Hall today. He has said: “We know the Jaguar Land Rover attack was state-sponsored.” When someone with such an outstanding record of service says that, we should take heed. Later I will touch on the role of Government in creating an open conversation with the public about the cost of cyber-risk to the British economy. I also want to mention the recent attacks on Harrods, Co-op and Marks and Spencer. It was a really difficult time for M&S team members in the York Vangarde store in my constituency; there were issues with everything from the café to online ordering. No doubt the cost of those specific attacks amounted to over £1 billion. I mention them because hostile nation states or their proxies are evidently intent on targeting the great British high street itself and the brands that so many of us are familiar with such as Jaguar Land Rover, M&S Co-op. With a similar modus operandi, criminals in Japan targeted a ransomware attack at Asahi—what an iconic Japanese beer that is. I mention that as an example of cyber-criminals working on behalf of a state-sponsored actor to target deliberately the core brands and institutions that are psychologically fundamental to the average citizen’s conception of the economy itself.

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