Contribution
My Lords, it is a pleasure for me to open our first discussion on this significant Bill, and I thank the Minister for introducing it in her customary clear way. I do not think she would disagree with me if I described the Bill as a landmark measure, proposing as it does a range of major changes to the way healthcare in England is organised, commissioned and delivered.
It is, therefore, I confess, a somewhat surreal feeling for me to lead off this debate for the Opposition, being the person responsible 14 years ago for steering through your Lordships’ House a number of the measures that this Bill now seeks to unwind. For a good many of us here, I suspect, the difficult parliamentary process that we had to go through in 2011-12 is seared on the memory—notwithstanding the fact that a large element of what we sought to achieve through the underlying policy, let us remind ourselves, commanded widespread support.
What were we seeking to achieve? There were two principal policy aims. One was to bring decision-making around the design of health services much closer to clinical leaders and, simultaneously, to redefine the role of Ministers as that of setting the broad strategic direction for the health service. Empowering clinicians and local managers was seen as a way of bringing to fulfilment the work of the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, when he was a Health Minister, which was to enable the system to commission for quality; in other words, to commission for patient outcomes whose quality could be measured by reference to defined national standards. That was the first policy aim.
The other main aim was to give public health a place at the table that it had not had for many years. With the creation of Public Health England as a discrete body within the National Health Service, Government Ministers were made directly and unambiguously responsible for population-based health policy and delivery. In the round, therefore, the intention was to make the system more responsive to people’s needs and, in so doing, to improve patient care and better protect the health of the nation. The upheaval arising from the reorganisation of NHS structures—I do not deny that it was an upheaval—was the price that we thought worth paying to achieve those desired ends.
My point in recalling all this is not to rehearse the Health and Social Care Act 2012; it is simply to point out that there was a purpose behind the Act that reflected an explicit intention and desire to benefit patients. The White Paper published by the Government in advance of that Bill was called Liberating the NHS, and the creation of NHS England as the national body accountable to Ministers for the delivery of NHS services was one of the principal measures designed to achieve that liberation.
The Bill before us proposes a step that is, I suggest, every bit as momentous, complex and time-consuming as the creation of NHS England: it is to take NHS England apart and abolish it. I do not doubt that Ministers are convinced of the need to take such a step, despite what will undoubtedly be a painful process for many committed and skilled men and women in the NHS who have lost or face losing their jobs. Let us not forget them and, equally, let us not forget NHS patients. The labyrinthine process of reabsorbing roles and responsibilities into the Department of Health and Social Care and parcelling out other roles and responsibilities to ICBs—bodies that are themselves undergoing restructuring—will, as sure as night follows day, eat up large slices of leadership capacity that would otherwise be devoted to service improvement.
That dilution of leadership bandwidth, with all the costs associated with it, is a big price. For that reason, I strongly suggest that we need to hear rather more from the Minister than we have hitherto about how she believes the abolition of NHS England will benefit those whom the NHS is there to serve—not how it will benefit the system, not how it will benefit the spending review, but how it will benefit patients, for that is surely the prime test against which the entire Bill should be judged.
As regards patients, the Government have repeatedly stated that their intention is to devolve greater responsibility to integrated care boards to allow decisions to be taken closer to the communities whose needs those boards are intended to understand. The Bill accordingly places a much greater proportion of commissioning responsibility directly with ICBs, including formal responsibility for primary care and other services which they currently commission under delegated arrangements.
However, at the same time, the Bill transfers to the Secretary of State extensive powers of oversight and direction. It creates a new general power to direct ICBs as to the exercise of their functions; it allows the Secretary of State to require ICBs to exercise health service functions on his or her behalf; and it transfers to the Secretary of State NHS England’s existing responsibilities for ICB resource allocation, financial directions, appointments and oversight.
The forces created by the Bill therefore pull in two opposing directions: one which devolves responsibility for commissioning and the other which centralises significant powers over the way that that responsibility is exercised. That is not merely a source of tension; it promises to be a source of confusion. If NHS England is to cease to exist, the arrangements that replace it, to be effective, must make authority and accountability completely clear.
That clarity matters on three levels. Those working within the health service need to know who is empowered to take a decision; patients and the public need to know who is responsible for what; and Parliament needs to know whom it should hold to account when services improve, and crucially, when they do not. We surely cannot have a situation in which, let us say, services at a local level deteriorate, and fingers of blame are then pointed in multiple directions. As a bare minimum, what we should be looking for with ministerial powers of direction is transparency in their use, what the reasons are for using them and what their financial and practical consequences are expected to be. More importantly, perhaps, we will need to examine at later stages whether the broad powers of direction granted to the Secretary of State should be circumscribed in order to ensure that NHS organisations enjoy sufficient autonomy, both to innovate and to be accountable for their own performance to the communities they serve.
What matters to those communities is the health service in their local area. As we speak, the NHS is undergoing upheaval and change. At a time when powers and roles are being shifted to the centre, and ICBs are being told to reorganise themselves on to different footprints, the risk of service disruption becomes that much greater. In a situation of this kind, it is surely all the more important that we have systems in place that can sound the alarm should any risks to service quality appear to be emerging. Yet, Clauses 70 and 71 of the Bill, together with Schedules 10 and 11, would abolish both Healthwatch England and all local Healthwatch arrangements—the very organisations that are there to meet that need.
I state here and now my grave concerns about this proposal. The value of Healthwatch is not simply the feedback it sends to commissioners and providers: it is a route independent of the wider system through which patients and service users can gain a voice. It is a way for them to highlight inequalities of access or of outcomes, and in doing so help to eliminate them. It is a means by which any worrying patterns of service provision can be identified in a timely fashion. The insights provided by Healthwatch are often very local and so not ones that necessarily become visible through published performance data. If we are to abolish these arrangements, we need to put something equally effective, equally accessible and equally trusted in their place. However, what this Bill proposes as a substitute for Healthwatch is not, in my view, likely to tick any of those boxes. My noble friend Lord Kamall will say more on this subject when he comes to speak later on. Healthwatch recommends itself as a model for patients and public involvement because it is trusted by the ordinary citizen. We risk squandering that trust at our peril.
It was put to me recently that trust is a commodity that arrives on a tortoise and leaves on the back of a racehorse. The same maxim can be applied to the proposals for HSSIB, the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, which, under the Bill, as the noble Baroness explained, is to be abolished as a separate organisation, its functions being transferred to the CQC. I have not yet heard a convincing argument in favour of that idea. The CQC is a regulator and inspector. HSSIB performs a deliberately different function. Its purpose is to investigate systemic patient safety failures in order to understand what went wrong, and for that reason it relies on people being willing to speak frankly about a serious safety event with a guarantee of anonymity. Whatever Chinese walls may be put in place within the CQC to keep the two functions separate, it is the way it looks. Once contributors fear or suspect that the information they supply is going to be fed through to a regulatory body, their confidence to speak up will evaporate.
Where does all this leave us? The Government’s case for abolishing NHS England rests in significant part on the proposition that doing so will remove duplication between NHS England and the department, reduce bureaucracy and release resources for frontline care. Ministers have said that the reforms are intended to save about £1 billion a year by the end of the Parliament. Against that, the Government now estimate that paid exits and redundancies across the department, NHS England, ICBs and commissioning support units will cost approximately £1 billion to £1.3 billion. On top of that, there is the cost of establishing the new commissioning arrangements. It would therefore be most helpful if the Minister could tell the House what assessment the Government have made of the net financial effect of the reorganisation. When does the department expect the cumulative savings generated by the new structure to exceed the costs of implementing it? What mechanisms will Parliament have to assess whether those savings have actually been realised?
There is a legitimate case for asking whether the present architecture of the NHS is too complex, whether responsibilities are sufficiently clear and whether resources currently devoted to bureaucracy could be used more effectively elsewhere. But any reform should make things better. Responsibilities should be clear. Accountability should be identifiable. Savings should be demonstrable, rather than assumed. Operational risks should be understood before functions are transferred, and reforms intended to simplify the system should not, in practice, create new ambiguity elsewhere. Above all, patients and the ordinary citizen should not be forgotten.
The NHS review of the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, which was commissioned by the Government in 2024, contained conclusions and recommendations which were warmly welcomed by Ministers. But the noble Lord ended up saying that
“a top-down reorganisation of NHS England and Integrated Care Boards is neither necessary nor desirable … Constant reorganisations are costly and distracting”.
Was the noble Lord right or was he wrong? I hope and trust that our further debates will come up with the answer.