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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 19 October 2026

Debate

Public Office (Accountability) Bill

Contribution

I thank the noble Baroness for bringing forward these amendments, which present the opportunity for me to provide some clarification on the points she has raised. Amendment 71 would create a definition of “misleading”, for the purposes of the offence of misleading the public, that replicates the definition of “misleading omissions” in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, as the noble Baroness said. We have not set out what “misleading” means in order to maintain its natural meaning and allow the offence to capture the types of behaviour that would usually be regarded as misleading. Clause 12 provides that an offence is committed where the act of an authority or official is misleading, and seriously improper where what may be seriously improper is set out. I am sure that we will engage with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and perhaps also the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and carry on the conversation then. Amendment 80 would require the consent of the Attorney-General before a prosecution for the offence of misleading the public may be brought. The Bill provides that a prosecution for the offence may be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Scrutiny of the decision to prosecute is therefore already provided for in the Bill. The consent of the Attorney for the prosecution of offences is usually required where the offence involves national security or has some international element—for example, if there could be a bearing on international obligations or international terrorism. Given the nature of the offence of misleading the public, the Government are of the view that requiring consent from the Director of Public Prosecutions is appropriate and would not meet the usual threshold to demand the consent of the Attorney. Turning to Amendment 73, Clause 1 of the Bill clearly sets out that public authorities and officials are expected to act with candour, transparency and frankness at all times, but criminal sanctions should be reserved for the most serious cases. The condition that an act has to have caused harm, or had the potential to cause harm, will achieve this effect, but it will not be a bar to prosecution in those cases. Let me try to explain why. First, the definition of harm is broad: it includes physical harm, psychological harm—including distress—and economic loss. This is a non-exhaustive list and can include other types of harm. The condition also includes harm or the potential for harm. This offence does not require there to be proof that it has caused harm against an individual. In cases such as Hillsborough and Horizon, evidence of harm caused by cover-ups is clear and apparent. We have designed this offence with historic incidents of state failures in mind, where, at a minimum, potential distress could be identified, and in many cases much more serious harm. The requirement for an act to have the potential to cause harm is a key condition to make sure the offence applies to serious cases only. The harm threshold ensures that the public, the police and prosecutors are able to distinguish between those actions that meet the threshold for criminal sanctions and those that should be dealt with through other routes, such as an organisation’s complaints process, or that are covered by other aspects of the law.

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