Public Office (Accountability) Bill
Monday, 19 October 2026
Contributions
Committee (2nd Day) (Continued)
Clause 12: Offence of misleading the public
Amendment 70 not moved.
Amendment 71
Moved by
71: Clause 12, page 13, line 8, at end insert— “(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), “misleading” is defined as when a person—(a) omits material information, or(b) omits information which the person is required under any other enactment to give to the public as part of the practice.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment seeks to include the definition of ‘misleading’ as is currently set out in Section 227 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024.
Baroness Finn (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 71 is in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. As with his previous amendments on the definition of recklessness, this amendment seeks to include a definition of “misleading” in the Bill. The reason for this inclusion is to address the current lack of clarity over its definition. The definition in the amendment comes from Section 227 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, which defines “misleading” as the omission of information. I emphasise that this definition is intended to be a starting point; although it is not necessarily an exact fit for the Bill, the purpose is to show that there is a potential solution for the current problem of lack of clarity. The definition should also include a reference to the inclusion of irrelevant information, but at this stage the purpose is to raise with the Minister the issue that we need a proper, clear definition, and we are open to discussion on the final wording. On Amendment 80, my honourable friend Nick Timothy argued in the other place for the inclusion of the requirement for the Attorney-General to institute or consent to any prosecution of the offence of misleading the public. This is important, and it is exactly what the amendment seeks to do. To mislead the public intentionally is of course not a good thing, and we certainly do not deny the existence of cover-ups and abuses in the past, but there is a risk that this offence could be used in such a way so as to curtail political debate. In order to prevent that from becoming the case, the inclusion of the barrier of the Attorney-General’s consent would ensure that these claims were not made with no basis and instead were made only when an issue was legitimate. I beg to move.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 73 in this group. As we heard from the noble Baroness, the new offence of misleading the public really must be set at an appropriately high hurdle and should lead to prosecution only in the most egregious cases. None the less, it is crucial in pushing the culture change that is behind this whole Bill. There are many offences which require proof of actual harm to an individual or group before they are perpetrated, but there are many which do not. Drug supply offences and, more relevantly, perverting the course of justice are examples of the latter. My suggestion is that this offence should not require the subsequent hurdle of proving harm. The inclusion of proof of harm in the Clause 12 offence is, I suggest, unnecessary for similar reasons to those offences regarding the administration of justice. It would also lead to various egregious examples of misleading the public not falling within the current draft of the provision, or make them impossible to prove in reality. One real-life example is a chief constable who published false crime figures. This was intended to mislead the public, but it would be very difficult to establish actual harm. Recent revelations by my noble friend Lord Beamish regarding the nuclear test vets case indicate that he was misled by senior civil servants regarding a proposed compensation scheme, which, in turn, led to the public being misled. Again, this is a case in which, should it fall within Clause 12, it would be very difficult to prove harm. The Prime Minister himself gave evidence to the infected blood inquiry that, as Health Secretary, he was misled by senior civil servants as to what the then Government knew about contaminated blood products. This caused him, innocently, to make inaccurate statements to the public. These officials ought to fall four-square within the offence, but the requirement to prove harm would make that difficult or impossible. In recent days, there have been extremely misguided analyses of Clause 12 in the media. To be clear, the new offence targets only the promulgation of false facts by public officials, anathema to their function and mission to act in the public interest. My amendment would not alter the high hurdle of intention or recklessness, however we land with the understandable discussion begun by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. My amendment would remove an unnecessary impediment to the offence working as intended in some of the most real and relevant cases. I urge the Committee to seriously consider removing the need to prove harm from an offence of dishonesty akin to other offences that I have mentioned.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for bringing forward these amendments, which present the opportunity for me to provide some clarification on the points she has raised. Amendment 71 would create a definition of “misleading”, for the purposes of the offence of misleading the public, that replicates the definition of “misleading omissions” in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, as the noble Baroness said. We have not set out what “misleading” means in order to maintain its natural meaning and allow the offence to capture the types of behaviour that would usually be regarded as misleading. Clause 12 provides that an offence is committed where the act of an authority or official is misleading, and seriously improper where what may be seriously improper is set out. I am sure that we will engage with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and perhaps also the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and carry on the conversation then. Amendment 80 would require the consent of the Attorney-General before a prosecution for the offence of misleading the public may be brought. The Bill provides that a prosecution for the offence may be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Scrutiny of the decision to prosecute is therefore already provided for in the Bill. The consent of the Attorney for the prosecution of offences is usually required where the offence involves national security or has some international element—for example, if there could be a bearing on international obligations or international terrorism. Given the nature of the offence of misleading the public, the Government are of the view that requiring consent from the Director of Public Prosecutions is appropriate and would not meet the usual threshold to demand the consent of the Attorney. Turning to Amendment 73, Clause 1 of the Bill clearly sets out that public authorities and officials are expected to act with candour, transparency and frankness at all times, but criminal sanctions should be reserved for the most serious cases. The condition that an act has to have caused harm, or had the potential to cause harm, will achieve this effect, but it will not be a bar to prosecution in those cases. Let me try to explain why. First, the definition of harm is broad: it includes physical harm, psychological harm—including distress—and economic loss. This is a non-exhaustive list and can include other types of harm. The condition also includes harm or the potential for harm. This offence does not require there to be proof that it has caused harm against an individual. In cases such as Hillsborough and Horizon, evidence of harm caused by cover-ups is clear and apparent. We have designed this offence with historic incidents of state failures in mind, where, at a minimum, potential distress could be identified, and in many cases much more serious harm. The requirement for an act to have the potential to cause harm is a key condition to make sure the offence applies to serious cases only. The harm threshold ensures that the public, the police and prosecutors are able to distinguish between those actions that meet the threshold for criminal sanctions and those that should be dealt with through other routes, such as an organisation’s complaints process, or that are covered by other aspects of the law.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. In the example of a chief constable who deliberately doctors the crime statistics to boost his or her own success, how easy does the Minister think it will be to prove actual, or even potential, harm?
Lord Lemos (Lab)
Frankly, I do not think that is the issue at all, but it would be wrong for me to comment on individual examples of that sort. I have set out what I think the issue in principle is.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
Let me try again without an individual example. When the public is misled, the harm is to public trust in those who govern us. Is the Minister saying that that harm is physical harm, psychological harm or economic loss? If it is none of those things, under the Bill as it stands, there could be no prosecution.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
That is a non-exhaustive list, but I am happy to take that point away. I am not suggesting that those are the only tests of harm.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, I would like to pursue the point being made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is citing the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, about atomic test victims. The Minister said in reply to my remarks earlier today that he would write to me specifically about the inquiries into the harm that might have been done to the atomic test victims by the misleading of Parliament when Tobias Ellwood told Parliament something he had been told by his officials which was subsequently shown to be wrong. Where does the blame lie there? It is not about prosecution; it is about what you do then to remedy or rectify that harm or damage done to the individuals involved. Tobias Ellwood was interviewed on 2 September by Victoria Derbyshire on the BBC, so this is in the public domain; this is not something I am making up as I go along.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
We have to take each case on its merits. The Government’s view is that it is important to have this harm threshold, as I am about to go on to say. Let me carry on a bit. It is the nature of public life that it is not uncommon for public officials or office holders to be accused of being untruthful when going about their daily tasks. The risk undermining the offence itself is if it is used to trigger police investigations into vexatious claims or to engage in political “lawfare”, rather than for the grave examples of state cover-up for which it was intended. That is the key point we are trying to drive at here: if there are serious and harmful consequences, there is a case for prosecution. But if, for other reasons, people are being told that they have not been telling the truth, that is not quite the same as what we would want the police and the prosecutors to be focusing on. The creation of an offence of this kind is a bold step. I am sure noble Lords will agree with that. Hillsborough families spoke of the importance of individual accountability, and we listened. I reassure noble Lords that it is clear from our engagement across the public sector that such a strong new measure, as drafted and when properly implemented—we will have a discussion, as we have said, about implementation—will have a serious and real deterrent effect, and we are confident that it and every other measure in the Bill will drive a culture of candour and truthfulness. I therefore request that the noble and learned Lord withdraw his amendment. Apologies, I mean the noble Baroness.
Baroness Finn (Con)
I thank the Minister, and I am very pleased with my upgrade to learned, so thank you. I thank the Minister for his willingness to engage on the potential need for a definition of “misleading” in the Bill. More disappointing was his response on including Attorney-General consent to the prosecution of the offence of misleading the public, but perhaps we can explore that further. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 71 withdrawn.
Amendment 72
Moved by
72: Clause 12, page 13, line 8, at end insert— “(1A) An act under subsection (1)(a) includes the provision of misleading information to a person acting for the purposes of journalism (as described in subsection (4)(b)) carried out via a press statement, media briefing, or other communication intended for dissemination by a recognised news publisher.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would ensure that the offence of misleading the public would include a public authority or public official providing misleading information to a recognised news publisher.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, the amendments in the previous group proposed some changes to what an offence for misleading the public is. This group moves to the who and the how in an official misleading the public. I have laid Amendments 72 and 77 in this group. In 1989, in his interim report on the Hillsborough disaster, Lord Justice Taylor made it unequivocally clear that although many fans had been drinking, most of them were “not drunk, nor even the worse for drink”. He concluded that this formed an exacerbating factor but that police seeking to rationalise their loss of control overestimated the element of drunkenness in the crowd. However, the statements by the police to the press at the time said that they believed it was the behaviour of the fans, especially those who were drunk and violent, that was the cause of the tragedy—and many in the press believed them, with Liverpool fans carrying the blame even when Lord Taylor had contradicted this view. It took a quarter of a century for the report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel to be published, and it noted in September 2012 that Lord Justice Taylor was clear that Chief Superintendent Duckenfield was “untruthful” to Mr Kelly, the chief executive of the FA, about the inrush of fans forcing open the gate. The police led the press to believe that much worse had happened. Lord Taylor called it a “vilification” of the fans: he had not found one single witness to support any of these allegations. These lies were believed by many in the press, some of whom began decades of negative stories about the Liverpool fans that day. The fans, their families and the city of Liverpool have spent years trying to expose the truth; they are extraordinary. The Hillsborough Independent Panel is a testament to their fortitude. Sadly, however, they are not alone. Officials in the Post Office lied to the press about some of the Horizon postmasters and about the problems with the Horizon system. In infected blood, doctors and Department of Health officials lied for decades—including to the press—about the true risks of using blood from America and how serious the consequences would be for people. That is why I have laid Amendment 72. In the United Kingdom, the press and publishers are still thought mostly to be reliable sources of information for their readers. Victims of all three of these tragedies could not even begin to recover while these lies persisted. The consequences of these lies for postmasters were court cases and being exposed as criminals; in the case of those who caught HIV and developed AIDS from infected blood, many were treated as pariahs in the difficult AIDS era. The Bill creates other offences but, for some reason, ignores the role of giving misleading information to journalists or news publishers, and this amendment attempts to rectify this. Clause 12 is important. As we have discussed in the Bill, the duty of candour needs both carrot and stick. Clause 12 sets out the key ground rules relating to misleading the public and a public official or public authority intentionally misleading the public or being reckless as to whether their act will do so or not. This is critical to ensure that the duty of candour works. The stick is the offence for which there are definitely legal consequences, but there is a carrot in this too: all public authorities and any other bodies training their officials would have to ensure that they all understand the guardrails about misleading the public and that improper behaviour will have consequences—especially when talking to the media and journalists. To those who say that Clause 12 goes too far, I say that the family members of Hillsborough victims had to watch as their loved ones were not only killed that day but had their reputations unjustly trashed because police officers intentionally misled the press. Clause 12 would rectify that and stop it happening in the future, and there would be consequences if a public official or organisation deliberately misled the press. I beg to move.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, I will intervene very briefly on this amendment. Before I do, however, I will describe my motivation for this intervention. Let me be clear that my deepest sympathy goes out to all of those affected by the appalling examples of dishonesty and cover-ups that have led to the need for the Bill, and which have just been referenced to by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. In seeking to probe the Government, I am merely doing my job as a Member of this place in trying to improve legislation and to make it more workable in a practical sense. No one doing their job should face innuendo that they are acting in bad faith, as some campaigners may be prone to suggest.
On Amendment 72, of course I accept all the examples given by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I have my own catalogue of experiences of appearing in the press, where misleading actions or, indeed, pure lies were attributed to me. I have spoken to more defamation lawyers than I ever thought I would need to speak to in my life, but I took no action against those libels, as I saw them. The reason for that is that I believe in an independent press, which, in our country—and we have fairly high standards—is usually an ethical and well-regulated press. I am very glad that I have spoken before the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.
It is profoundly important, in drafting legislation, that we are aware of Article 10 rights for public officials as much as for any other body. Public officials do not give up their Article 10 rights when they put on their lanyards and come into work. The press has been credulous in accepting things that are perhaps improbable, with things that happened far more frequently in the past than they happened today, because proprietors, the law and journalists themselves are rather more ethical than they were 45 years ago.
On that basis, I would be reluctant to see an amendment of this sort to this Bill, whereby people would face criminal sanctions for speaking to journalists about things that they may, in good or bad faith, consider to have happened. We have to respect that in terms of press freedoms.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I do not for a moment dispute the right of the Government to bring forward legislation imposing a duty of candour. It was in the manifesto, and in any event, there is generally agreement across parties that public authorities and officials should be candid. The need for this has been graphically illustrated by Hillsborough, the Post Office and many other scandals. The requirement for the creation of a criminal offence, such as we see in Clause 12, was not in the manifesto. Even if it had been, it does not relieve your Lordships’ House of the task of scrutinising the legislation, particularly a clause which has such a wide potential scope. Clause 12, described just a moment ago by the Minister as a “bold step”, will create an offence of misleading the public by public officials. It is a free-standing criminal offence. On conviction, a defendant could face up to two years’ imprisonment. A public authority includes a Minister of the Crown, a government department, the devolved Administrations, the Armed Forces, police forces, local authorities, NHS bodies, schools and any other body with functions of a public nature. A public official, which appears, in this context, to include those who work for a school, is anyone who works for or holds office under such a body. My first question to the Minister is: can he clarify quite how many public officials would be caught by this definition so as to render them potentially liable to conviction of a serious offence? We heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, that there are some 6 million civil servants, but there are many others who would classify themselves as public officials, and we have a significantly large public sector in this country. My second question is: what sort of behaviour is intended to be caught by this clause that would not be captured by the provisions of the Bill—Clauses 13, 14, 17 and 18—or by the general criminal law? Examples would help. I looked at the Explanatory Notes. One of the examples given was a department covering up “the harmful consequences of a policy”. With respect, that seems to describe what government is regularly accused of doing in the rough and tumble of politics, yet it could apparently be a criminal offence. The clause is extremely vague, which gives rise to rule-of-law objections. As we have already heard, “misleading” is a tricky word. When is a political statement that tends to emphasise positive rather than negative facts—or vice versa, depending on the source—to be regarded as “misleading”? “Seriously improper” is defined, but it includes not only an act of concealment but “obfuscation”. What is or is not “obfuscation” is very difficult to say. There is a defence—which I think the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, will address to the Committee—that is supposed to provide some form of defence. At the moment, I am not convinced of how satisfactory it is. If the Conservative Front Bench had its way, a prosecution would proceed only with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney-General. Is this a sufficient safeguard? I am not seeking to impugn the integrity of any DPP, but will he or she not have to take some very difficult, almost political decisions? We know that prosecuting authorities can be judicially reviewed, and that mischievous people can attempt prosecutions for political reasons. My provisional view is that this offence, although motivated by the best motives, is a big leap forward—one that potentially renders people vulnerable to prosecution who should be not the intended victims. While many people who might be prosecuted might be acquitted, they would still have to go through the process of being subjected to the criminal justice system. That is the first point. The second point—which is perhaps more important—is the question of what effect this particular provision will have on public administration. I recommend the Policy Exchange document on the Bill that was published last week, and in particular the foreword by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who knows a great deal about public administration. The authors of the paper drew comparisons between the now much-regretted Freedom of Information Act and this piece of legislation. I looked to see what the periodical Local Government Lawyer —probably not a publication terribly familiar to your Lordships—might say about Clause 12. Generally, the publication is not politically contentious; it is there to guide local governments as to potential legal vulnerabilities. It said this of the Bill: “The breadth of the offence will likely require existing codes of conduct, employee policies, protocols and training materials to be revised. Anti-corruption measures will be familiar in many public bodies, but may not … capture the full range of behaviours that will be criminalised by Clause 12”. That sounds like an absolute avalanche of legal intrusion into the way that public authorities will have to operate in the future. If the Freedom of Information Act 2000 was supposed to change the culture of secrecy, it has, in many people’s view, made people reluctant to commit frank views to paper at all. Many feel that it has had the opposite effect to that which was intended and has not made for better government. Clause 12 similarly runs the risk of making officials much more reluctant to put provisional or controversial views on paper. Decisions may be taken only in small groups. Notes may well be taken very much with the prospect of being scrutinised. We heard earlier in debates about the problem of people potentially deleting notes or deleting digital footprints. There may not be anything to delete if this becomes law. Lawyers will be involved and lawyers do not always help make good decisions, whatever their intentions. It may well be that the people involved in making decisions feel that they had better not write anything at all. To reassure the Whips on the Front Bench, I am not intending to divide the House over this issue, but I am seeking to probe the Government on how this is going to work. I had some sympathy with the amendment spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on the requirement for harm. This is a step into the unknown which I am not convinced will be satisfactory. In fact, I fear the worst.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 76 is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I declare my interest as the general secretary of the Free Speech Union. Before I come to my amendment, with reference to Amendment 72, my concern is that it would make it much harder for journalists and public officials to communicate with each other in confidence. From my own experience as a journalist, I know that quite often public officials, politicians and Ministers will add a bit of topspin to the information they are providing you with. You learn to take that into account and counterbalance it by talking to their political opponents or to people who disagree with them. In the end, you come to a mature, informed decision. My worry is that, if it becomes a criminal offence for a public official to mislead a journalist, that will make it much harder to get public officials to talk to journalists. There is one quirk in the amendment. The criminal offence would apply only to public officials who mislead journalists working for recognised news publishers. That would create a perverse incentive for public officials to communicate in confidence only with unrecognised news publishers, knowing that they would not be liable for prosecution if whatever they told them was then published. Unrecognised news publishers would presumably do less checking and be less scrupulous about simply regurgitating whatever misleading things they have been told by public officials. Therefore, for a variety of reasons, Amendment 72 would be unwise. I share the reservations of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, on Clause 12. My particular concern is that it will have a chilling effect, preventing public officials contributing to debates for fear of prosecution. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill say that the offence is not intended to stifle public debate or prevent people expressing opinions. My amendment simply asks the Government to put that assurance in the Bill. Why does that matter? It is because Explanatory Notes are not law and public bodies are adept at ignoring them. Take the Equality Act 2010. The Explanatory Notes say, regarding Section 26 on harassment, that “courts and tribunals will continue to be required to balance competing rights”. It names “freedom of expression” and “academic freedom” as two of those competing rights. Yet, in the Free Speech Union’s experience stretching to over 7,000 cases, that balancing exercise is often missing from the harassment policies of employers, universities and public bodies. This free speech protection was written into the notes of the Equality Act but not the Act itself and has often been overlooked as a consequence.
Nor is the line between a false statement and an opinion always easy to draw. That is not just my view; it is the view of a review commissioned by the Government Office for Science and published in May. Its authors are not sceptics about the dangers of misinformation—far from it—yet they acknowledge that
“false and misleading information is sometimes hard to differentiate clearly from legitimate opinion”.
In other words, one person’s false and misleading information is another person’s legitimate opinion.
Let me give an example. Recently, the Prime Minister told “The Rest is Politics” podcast that he had asked his officials if there had been Russian interference in the 2016 EU referendum and had received
“the clear answer that, yes, there was”.
Some will regard that as misleading. In the other place, the leader of the Opposition said,
“you cannot fight misinformation with misinformation ”.—[ Official Report , Commons, 14/10/26; col. 359.]
Others, including many in this House, will no doubt regard it as a legitimate opinion. If my amendment is not accepted, the police will have to decide whether a complained of statement was one or the other. Surely we do not want the police, or indeed the Crown Prosecution Service, spending hours parsing the contributions of Ministers to political debates to determine whether they are misinformation or legitimate expressions of opinion.
The Prime Minister’s remarks on “The Rest is Politics” are an example of
“unprepared comments made by Ministers during political interviews”,
which, according to the Explanatory Notes,
“should be viewed differently to a formal statement made by the Minister and released through a government department”.
To protect Ministers, including Prime Ministers, from being investigated by the police following the receipt of politically motivated complaints, those words should be included in the Bill.
That brings me to vexatious complaints more generally. There are two routes by which Clause 12 could be turned against an honest official. The Bill’s safeguard addresses only one of them, and does that inadequately. The first is private prosecution. In 2019, a private prosecutor persuaded a district judge to issue a summons against Boris Johnson for misconduct in public office over claims he made during the referendum campaign, before the High Court eventually quashed it. To their credit, the Government have made some efforts to close that door. Schedule 3 provides that proceedings under Clause 12 may be brought
“only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions”.
But is that a strong enough safeguard? The current DPP’s term is due to expire in October 2028, which means a Labour-appointed DPP could be in office when there is a change of Government. Who is to say that that DPP would not consent to a private prosecution brought against a Conservative or Reform Minister in 2029? As my friend the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, the decision would, in many cases, be a political decision, not a straightforwardly legal decision. It is for that reason that I support Amendment 80, which would at least require the consent of the Attorney-General before a prosecution could proceed.
The second route is a complaint to the police, and here a consent requirement offers no protection at all. It applies only when proceedings are instituted. Everything before that, from the complaint and the investigation to the interview under caution, happens without any prosecutor being involved. Section 25 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 even provides that a consent requirement does not prevent a suspect being arrested. We know at the Free Speech Union, from the history of non-crime hate incidents, how readily the police will record and pursue complaints, and in some cases arrest the people complained of, that should never have troubled them. For the person on the receiving end, the investigation is the punishment, whatever a prosecutor eventually decides. Neither DPP consent nor Attorney-General consent can prevent that.
Amendment 76 would go some way to addressing this problem. It would provide that:
“An act is not seriously improper … if it consists of … the expression of an opinion, or … a contribution made in good faith to debate on a matter of public interest”.
That protection falls away where the person knowingly asserts a statement of fact they know to be false, so the liar gets no shelter. What is protected is honest opinion and good faith argument. By including those protections in the Bill, my amendment would give the police a clear basis to turn a vexatious, politically motivated complaint away at the outset.
The case is stronger still in the light of Amendments 78 and 79, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. They would replace the reasonable excuse defence with a narrower public interest defence and place the burden of proving it on the defendant. If the offence is going to be made easier to make out—and I do not think it should, obviously—the line between opinion and falsehood must be drawn clearly at the outset.
If the Minister says the clause would never be used in this way then there is no cost in accepting the amendment. If there is a risk of expressions of opinion being mischaracterised as misinformation, and the Government Office for Science’s paper on misinformation suggests there is, then this Committee should shut it down now, thereby nipping thousands of vexatious complaints in the bud.
A law against misleading the public should not itself mislead the public about where the boundaries of lawful speech lie by including free speech safeguards in the Explanatory Notes but not in the Bill itself.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Young, make a serious point, and one that I do not think can simply be brushed away. It seems to me that the strongest answer to it is, or ought to be, the condition in subsection (3)(a) that, to be a criminal offence, in addition to the other criteria being satisfied, the act has to involve “dishonesty that was significant or repeated”. Traditionally, of course, in our courts, dishonesty is left for the jury to decide in the light of their experience of everyday life, but this Bill seeks to define a little what is meant by dishonesty, saying “whether by means of falsehood, concealment, obfuscation or otherwise”. I would like to suggest to the Minister a small change to this Bill that might go some way towards immunising it or protecting it from the sort of criticisms noble Lords have just heard so eloquently expressed. We know from the way those words are drafted that dishonesty must go broader than merely a falsehood, and broader also than a concealment, because otherwise you would not need any other word. That is the first point. The second point is the word that is chosen: “obfuscation”. I am afraid my iPhone subscription takes me no further than the Cambridge Dictionary , but that tells me that to obfuscate means “to make something less clear and harder to understand, especially intentionally”. Anyone reading that obfuscation is a form of dishonesty might be minded to take a very broad view of what dishonesty means—a view that obviously goes beyond merely the lie direct or the concealment of the truth. Seeing that word obfuscation there makes me a little worried that noble Lords have a point when they speak of the chilling effect and the unpredictable extent of this offence. Although I am afraid I have not got an amendment down to remove the word obfuscation, I suggest that if there are to be discussions on this before Report, it might be something we should all bear in mind.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, there have been some important points made and I am sympathetic to the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I keep thinking that there will be unintended consequences of this. It is difficult because—and I do not say this in a sarcastic way—this is a very worthy, noble Bill. I do not want to betray its intentions, but I fear that if we do not challenge it and scrutinise it properly, it will itself betray what it is trying to do by creating a whole new set of problems. In our previous day in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, raised some important points about the dangers of overcriminalisation and the damaging outcomes it could have. Clause 12 fits very much into that spectrum. I also have a lot of sympathy with the criticisms made by the noble Lord, Lord Young, of Amendment 72 on the provision of misleading information to the press and how that could be used or interpreted. Inasmuch as the press is a valuable way to hold power to account, it is very important that we do not inadvertently do anything that stops the press getting hold of some more difficult stories. People might not intend to mislead—we can think of malevolent reasons for the press being told lies about people—but things might be said to the press in good faith, when we want to encourage more whistleblowing to the media, not less, if we are to shine a light on wrongdoing in society. I have some hesitancy here, but I put my name to Amendment 74, which seeks to include as an offence a civil servant misleading a Minister. In a way, I was trying to respond to the notion of a two-tier issue. Documented cases exist in which civil servants and senior officials have provided incomplete, inaccurate and misleading information to Ministers or have kept key facts from them. We are aware of this and, as the Civil Service Code requires honest and impartial advice and supposedly prohibits deliberately withholding relevant information from Ministers, it might seem extreme if we now say that this should be made the law and a legal offence created. But, in a way, that is what the whole Bill does. I am a bit torn on this. The inquiry into the Post Office/Horizon IT scandal was told that officials had misled Ministers or had failed to provide accurate, impartial advice. There have been accusations that Ministers were misled on everything from the scale of the backlogs of asylum and immigration cases to the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. That has been documented in the Foreign Affairs Committee and elsewhere. To quote that committee, civil servants were “at best intentionally evasive, and often deliberately misleading”. That is an atrocious situation. I do not want to let Ministers off the hook and get into a cheap “blame the blob” situation, but I have experienced situations such as a Minister reading out advice, in relation to issues of sex and gender—as it happens—when I challenged their interpretation of the Equality Act 2010. The Minister read out information that was inaccurate and misleading, and I felt this was driven by a more ideological intervention, because I challenged the Minister and they were just reading out what they had been given. The Supreme Court might have clarified this, but the law was the law before it clarified what it was. Ministers had been given bad advice and yet it was difficult to challenge that. That made me consider taking this amendment seriously. I am going to completely contradict myself now because, having put my name on that amendment, I have changed my mind. This is a bit unhelpful, but it might help if I explain why I have ended up somewhere else. It suddenly dawned on me that those officials could well claim that they were simply using good faith judgment to advise the Minister; they were not trying actively to mislead, even though I have some sympathy with the notion that a lot of the Civil Service is overly ideological and too partial on some highly contentious issues.
What if they give the advice on a contested area in good faith? Will they be in scope of committing an offence? That is what leads me to concerns that the Bill could inadvertently lead not to candour of speech at all but to the chilling of speech, which is why I absolutely support Amendment 76 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton.
The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, noted in an earlier group the dangers of criminalising breaches of a code of conduct. Every time I hear about different aspects of the Bill, it suddenly dawns on me that, at this rate, no one will say anything ever for fear of criminal consequences and liability. The noble Lord said that where codes go, the lawyers will certainly follow—and all I can see in the Bill are more and more lawyers all over the place. I think we heard that from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and I thought freedom of information was a perfect example of that. I remember meeting some friends who basically said that they do not write anything down now. I thought that that was hardly a satisfactory situation, and I feel that that could happen now. I am worried that the provisions in Clause 12 will be weaponised and that the criminalisation of misleading the public will become used to litigiously point the finger at other people and seriously risks having a chilling impact on political disagreement or debate.
I will give one example and then finish. If you can imagine that we did not know anything, in the early discussions, having spoken to people who were involved about the worries that they had about gangs of people raping and sexually abusing children and young women in northern towns, the former MP Ann Cryer, who is one of my heroines from that time, raised the issue in 2003 or 2004—for which she was called a racist. I met some people after that who thought that there were criminal gangs operating in the school where they taught, and some other people who were social workers who feared that there was an organised gang going on. They were public officials. They did not necessarily all speak out then, for fear of being accused of Islamophobia or racism, following on from what had happened to Ann Cryer, for goodness’ sake—she was named a racist when she was anything but. Now they could be in the situation where they would not speak out because they could be criminally liable if they were wrong. They were speculating. They would not be trying to mislead; they would be trying to say, “Do you think there could be?”
We want our public officials to speak freely, to be able to say, “What if this is the case? What do you think? Could it be that?” I am concerned that, this way, they could fear that they would be criminalised for some of the things they would say. I do not want officials to water down the advice that they give public officials on contested areas for fear of criminalisation, and I do not want public officials to start biting their tongue and being frightened to say anything in case they get accused of misleading the public when they are trying to raise matters on behalf of the public in good faith. If there is nothing to concern us and the Government say, “Don’t worry about it”, that is absolutely fine: put it in the Bill, and that will be reassurance enough for me.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, because so many speakers in the debate on this amendment have mentioned the Freedom of Information Act, I wanted to make one or two observations to do with that Act. The most important one, I think, is that, despite all the evidence provided in the Policy Exchange report Legislating for Candour? , from Prime Ministers and all sorts of other people, at least for the Freedom of Information Act, the deep concern we have heard across the Committee is that this will turn into another example of the kind of Act which has in fact reduced candour rather than improving accountability, and makes public servants so cautious of what they might say that little is said orally that could be repeated in written notes. At least in the FoIA, there is a Section 36 exemption, which applies to material relating to the conduciveness of good policy-making. That is used frequently by all sorts of public bodies. In this case, however, in this Bill and in Clause 12, that Section 36 exemption would not apply, which is one of the reasons that I think the entire Clause 12 really needs to be taken out of this Bill. I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Young, said in his argument today. I was particularly mindful of the podcast given recently by the Prime Minister about Russian interference, and I am very glad he raised it. I was going to raise it myself when I came to discuss the concerns in this Bill. When you have the use of language such as tests of “knowing” or “ought to have known”, “seriously improper” defined only by reference to sub-clauses where you depart significantly from what is to be expected in the proper exercise of the person’s functions as a public authority or public official, and, of course, the issues to do with harm and obfuscation raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I expect there will be quite a lot to contemplate in terms of the deleteriousness of this clause and the impact it might have on public discourse and freedom of expression. I hope the Minister will be open to having deep and substantive conversations with regard to this.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 78 and 79 in my name. These amendments concern the defence to the new offence of misleading the public created by Clause 12, and they should be considered together with Amendments 85, 86, 88 and 89, which fall within the next group, because they raise the same issues in relation to the offences created by Clauses 13 and 14. These amendments matter because they determine whether these new offences provide an effective means of enforcing accountability, or whether in practice they may prove so difficult to enforce that they prove to be nothing more than a paper tiger. My amendments propose two changes in relation to all three of the new offences. First, they replace the defence of “reasonable excuse” with a defence that the defendant was acting in the public interest. Secondly, they place the burden on the defendant to establish the defence. The starting point is that all three of these new offences are serious ones. Two of the three replace the old common-law offence of misconduct in public office, and all three are directed at conduct that undermines confidence in public administration and erodes trust in those who hold public office. If Parliament is creating offences of this kind, the defence should be clear, objective and appropriately limited. The first question, then, is: why is “public interest” a better option than “reasonable excuse”? The concern is that the defence of reasonable excuse risks being both too broad in scope and too uncertain in its application. When the Law Commission recommended the abolition of the common-law offence of misconduct in public office, it recommended a public interest defence, not a reasonable excuse defence. The distinction is important. A public interest defence asks not merely whether the officeholder can explain their actions, but whether those actions were genuinely justified in the interest of the public whom they serve. A person may well believe that their conduct was administratively convenient, politically expedient or justified because it protected their institution, whether that institution be the Civil Service, the police or the security services. But none of those things necessarily means that what they did was in the public interest. I suggest that it is self-evident that most public officials who commit these kinds of crimes do not set out deliberately to commit an offence. They may believe that they are being pragmatic, that they are protecting their organisation, or that they are responding to straitened finances or other difficult circumstances. In their own minds, they may think that what they have done is entirely reasonable—but that does not help the victims, and that is not the same thing as acting in the public interest. Imagine a prison governor who decides to reduce the number of suicide watches to save money. The governor may argue that financial pressures provided a reasonable excuse for that decision, and in order to decide whether that is right, a jury would have to consider arguments about competing priorities, budgets, judgments and so on. A public interest defence asks a much clearer question: was it truly in the public interest to expose vulnerable prisoners to greater risk to save money? Which question do your Lordships believe victims and survivors whose experiences provide the impetus for this Bill would think is more important? A public interest defence is not unusual. There are many other examples to be found in the criminal law. For example, Section 4 of the Obscene Publications Act contains a defence that publication of the article in question was justified as being for the public good. In the context of all three offences created by this Bill, a public interest defence would continue to safeguard those who require protection, particularly whistleblowers acting to expose wrongdoing. What it would not do is permit broad and subjective explanations to be advanced for conduct that has fallen below the standard that society requires of a public officer. That brings me to the second issue: who should bear the burden of proof? This was explicitly considered by the Law Commission, which considered that doing this—putting the burden on the prosecution—could create significant practical difficulties in proving these offences. In many cases, the facts underlying the defence will be known mainly, or possibly exclusively, by the defendant. They may wish to say that they acted on particular information, received particular advice, held a particular belief or were motivated by a particular public interest concern, yet it would be for the prosecution to disprove those assertions. The Law Commission specifically cautioned against this. It considered that requiring the prosecution to disprove such matters could impose unrealistic evidential burdens and, in some cases, require prosecutors to prove the non-existence of facts. These amendments address that problem in a straightforward and proportionate way. If a defendant wishes to rely upon the defence that they acted in the public interest, the burden of establishing it would fall on them, but only to the civil standard. This is not unusual, nor is it unfair. It is not unfair because the prosecution would still have to prove every element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence remains intact. The Law Commission concluded that such an approach would be compatible with Article 6 of the European convention. It is not unusual because Parliament frequently adopts this approach where the relevant facts are particularly within the defendant’s knowledge. For example, a person charged with possessing a bladed article in a public place must prove that they had good reason or lawful authority for having it. The burden is on them because only they will know why they had the knife with them. There are many other examples, including the defences created by the Bribery Act, which put the burden of proof on the defendant. The comparison with the Bribery Act exposes another oddity about these defences. Clause 12(6)(a), which mirrors Section 13 of the Bribery Act, places the burden of proof on the defendant, yet Clause 12(6)(b) places the burden on the prosecution. No explanation has been given for why two statutory defences appearing side by side in the same clause have different burdens of proof. The Government ought to explain to victims and the wider public why they have chosen a route that the Law Commission explicitly rejected as making these offences too difficult to enforce. The Explanatory Notes say that its provisions are in line with the Law Commission’s recommendations; that is simply not correct in relation to these defences. This matters because we need to be sure that these defences are capable of practical enforcement. Victims and survivors deserve no less.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, this Committee stage of the Bill is a good illustration in the context of the speech we have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, of why we need to go into the granular detail and why we need to look at what the implications may be. This also touches on what the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, were talking about: how a Bill such as this could potentially have a chilling effect and why we have to ensure that it does not. I was struck at the contrast between, for instance, the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, who reminded us of how the media became involved in telling falsehoods about what happened at Hillsborough, and the role that the media can often play in being in the vanguard of exposing truth. It does not always fall one way or the other.
I was thinking, as I was sitting here, that I used to share this Bench sometimes with Lord Armstrong, who as Robert Armstrong went to the Spycatcher trial in Australia and used that very telling phrase about being “economical with the truth”—a far cry from Ben Jonson, who said:
“Stand for truth, and ’tis enough”.
This Bill, I think, is seeking to do that. It is about finding the truth, getting to the heart of the matter and doing what we can to put aside untruthful remarks, whether they are made by the media, officials or even politicians or human rights organisations—whoever it may be. The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, was complaining earlier about the role that some campaigners can have sometimes in criticising Members of both Houses. I think part of this is the give-and-take of public life and politics, but it can go too far. We also have to guard against things such as cancel culture that try to stop proper debate. It is good that we are examining these questions in this kind of detail.
I want to specifically support Amendment 74, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. We have yet to hear from him his specific reasons for this amendment, but it touches on something I raised earlier, in an amendment that preceded this, but also during my own remarks earlier today about atomic test victims. I have taken the trouble to go back to the debate of 19 December 1984, in which I participated, in which I said that, “The document”—we were talking about documents that had been concealed—
“gives the lie to the suggestion that service men were properly clothed or that proper precautions were taken”.
This was in the context of ex-servicemen who were at Christmas Island or Maralinga being deliberately, it was said, exposed to the effects of radiation to test how good the protections were, or how flimsy they might be. I said in the House:
“One paragraph describes what the Army set out to do in the tests. It is a Ministry of Defence document which was top secret. It reads: ‘The Army must discover the detailed effects of various types of explosion on equipment, stores and men with and without various types of protection.’ So the men who were to be involved in the atomic explosions were to be exposed to the effects of radiation … to discover what the effects would be on them”.—[ Official Report , Commons, 19/12/1984; cols. 392-93.]
That is the very issue that was still being argued about as recently as 2 September. I referred to it earlier: the BBC Newsnight programme, where Victoria Derbyshire, doing her job in the media, cross-examined the former Veterans Minister Tobias Ellwood, who said he had misled Parliament because he had been deliberately misled by officials. These are really serious charges. I am not suggesting that someone should be prosecuted, but, given the harms test we were discussing earlier on, I would plead again with the Minister to take a look at this particular case and say what it is that we should be doing in those kinds of circumstances. What difference would this Bill make? If it would make no difference, I think we have failed one of its tests.
The other brief remark I want to make is about Clause 12 itself. I do not accuse the noble Baroness, or indeed my noble friend Lord Faulks, of acting in bad faith, which I think was the phrase the noble Baroness used earlier on, in any way. I do not think that they have acted in bad faith, of course; they have the absolute right to test amendments, but I would urge them to think very carefully before moving something as substantive as a clause stand part debate to remove a whole clause from this Bill. Clause 12 sets out the offence of misleading the public, which is fundamental to this Bill. I can only imagine the sense of bewilderment—perhaps even betrayal—among Hillsborough families who have worked so hard, tirelessly, for 37 years for a law to tackle the lack of accountability and injustice that characterised their experience. As we have heard repeatedly, many others have been denied justice and truth by a system that has favoured institutions and the powerful. If this clause were to be removed, it would represent a continuation—
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
The noble Lord has alluded specifically to something that I said. We all understand the commitment made by the Government in their 2024 manifesto, and I do not think anyone in this House would not wish to abide by that commitment. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, referred to it as a noble Bill, and I think the sentiment is widely shared that the things that have gone wrong in the past should not have happened under any circumstance at all, and that the circumstances of them were shocking—which is why we are here now—and reprehensible. However, to go back repeatedly, as the noble Lord has just done in speaking about Christmas Island and radiation and so on—
Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)
I apologise to the noble Baroness, but interventions should be short and ask a specific question.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
When the noble Lord wishes to remind us that this all relates to those events of the past, will he accept—here is my question—that, as a whole, British civil servants and the British state do not set out day to day to harm people but set out to do a job in good faith, but the implication of some of the debates we have heard is that they do not do that and they actually set out intentionally to harm? Will he accept that?
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
No, I do not accept that. I do not think the noble Baroness could have been listening to what I had to say earlier today about the deliberate changes that were made, for instance, to police notebooks to tell the opposite of what had taken place. I do not think she listened to what I had to say about the 20,000 ex-servicemen, some of whom are still alive, who were exposed to radiation in those tests. The families of those involved at Hillsborough, many of whom are alive today, still mourn the deaths of their loved ones. If she heard what I had to say earlier today in relation to one of my amendments, she would know that the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, and indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, spent a lot of time with one of those families today, talking to the sister and the mother of someone who lived for over three decades before he became the 97th victim because he had been crushed at Hillsborough. These are not theoretical or abstract issues; they are issues that have to be settled by Parliament, and I think the Bill seeks to do that. If it were not for our Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, who waived the 30-year rule when he was Culture Secretary back in 2009, 450,000 pages of previously withheld documents would not have become public, and I doubt we would be here today. I remind the noble Baroness of the title of the report by the Bishop of Liverpool: The Patronising Disposition of Unaccountable Power . That title says everything that this House needs to hear about how we can be perceived outside. If we were to lobotomise the Bill by removing the whole of Clause 12—that is, after all, what a clause stand part amendment seeks to do, so I do not regard it as trying to look at the granular detail or provide improvements to the Bill—that would be very destructive indeed.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, in this group I do not propose to add to anything that was said by my noble friend Lady Brinton as to why Clause 12 is important. It seems to me that there is an answer to the stand part notice tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, and to some of the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, which is that this offence in the Bill is confined to serious cases, and it involves and has to involve serious impropriety. That is the first safeguard. The second safeguard is the consent of the DPP or of the Attorney-General.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
It is the DPP.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
It is the DPP at the moment but the Conservative amendment is trying to make it the Attorney-General. For my part, either consent is a serious safeguard. I do not believe it is likely that the Bill will ever be used in a case that is frivolous or a case that is simply trying to stifle free speech. I do, however, agree with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that the inclusion of “obfuscation” as an indication of serious impropriety is bordering on the absurd, not simply because it is not easy to avoid obfuscating the meaning of the word obfuscation but because it is not a very serious test. There is much of what the noble Lord, Lord Young, said that I cannot agree with. Nevertheless, he was speaking to Amendment 76. The drafting of the amendment is very specific and, I suggest, not offensive. The amendment could act as a serious protection of the right to free speech and journalism. It says: “An act is not seriously improper for the purposes of this section if it consists of … the expression of an opinion, or … a contribution made in good faith to debate on a matter of public interest, unless it involves the knowing assertion of a statement of fact which the person knows to be false”. For my part, I could not object to the inclusion of those words in this Bill, even though I disagreed with the general tenor of some of what the noble Lord said. As to the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, I was persuaded by her that a public interest defence would probably work better and more effectively, and be more readily understood, than the reasonable excuse defence, which is the catch-all in the present drafting of the Bill. I also believe that the burden of proof being put on the defence in cases such as this is not remotely unusual, and that that would be acceptable. I turn now to Amendment 75, in my name, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has added her name. That would make it an offence for a person to encourage, directly or indirectly, or through a third party, a public officeholder to commit an offence of misleading the public. I will deal with this in some detail, because ancillary liability is often misunderstood and it generally follows a principal offence. It is necessary for ancillary liability for there to be a principal offence. This is not simple ancillary liability that would be added by this amendment. It is not ancillary liability for the encouragement or instigation of an offence. This offence would be committed even if there were no principal offence. The point of it is that an attempt to get a public officeholder to commit an offence of misleading the public under Clause 12 would be an offence even if the public officeholder resisted that attempt, so that there was no principal offence. This is important. The anomaly has been highlighted by Spotlight on Corruption, and I am grateful for its briefings. Normal ancillary liability of a secondary offender requires that a principal offender commit the offence, but this would be committed by anyone who attempted to get a public officeholder to mislead the public in a criminal way within subsection (1), for whatever purpose, even if the attempt were unsuccessful. In that sense, the ancillary would be suborning, or attempting to suborn, the public officeholder. I suggest that that should be an offence of misleading the public or of inciting the misleading of the public. The attempt to undermine the probity of a public officeholder by attempting to persuade him or her to commit an offence justifies criminal sanction. For that reason, because of the suborning nature of the offence, it is unsurprising that Spotlight on Corruption has shown that interest, as it is a form of corruption that should be subject to sanction.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
I wonder if the noble Lord would be kind enough to answer this. He has dealt very fully with the reason for there being an offence, how it is justified and how important it is that there should be, as it were, teeth to the Bill, but he has not dealt with the second point that I made. What is the collateral effect of the existence of this offence on public administration and the attitude of public officials who would want, naturally, to avoid being prosecuted or contravening these rather complex provisions?
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
The answer is that you have to trust in the robustness of public officials, because there is no reason why they should be scared of offending against these provisions if they avoid serious impropriety. There simply is not. This is an offence that is designed to be confined to serious cases whose prosecution involves the consent of the DPP—or the Attorney-General, depending on whose version you will accept. That does not mean that public officials are going to be so weak that they will change the face of their own administration or conduct for fear of prosecution for this offence. The offence is simply not likely to work that way; I do not believe there is any significant danger of any public official worth his or her salt being so deterred.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I will begin with Amendment 74, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie, which I have signed. This got some indirect support—unusual for my amendments—from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in the previous group. I thank her in her absence. Perhaps more relevantly, it got a lot of support from the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, in this group. I am grateful for his support because this amendment is a proposed extension of the new statutory offence under Clause 12 for the deliberate misleading of a Minister by a civil servant. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, gave us some examples across the years. The short point is this: if the offence is to apply to Ministers, it seems sensible and logical that it should apply also to civil servants. The offence applies to debate outside this House. Of course, anything said in Parliament is, rightly, privileged; we had that discussion in the previous group. Given that, it is all the more important—it is paramount—that Ministers are not misled by their own officials before coming to this place. If we do not include civil servants within the offence, there is no way to hold officials to account when Parliament is misled. I am very grateful for the Minister’s engagement to date. I respectfully ask him to look at this point again before Report, because we think it is a lacuna in the Bill. I am aware that the Minister believes the offence to be covered by the offences in Clause 13. For this offence, however, it seems to us that it would be very important and sensible to have clarity on the face of the Bill. There was a suggestion that clarification is unnecessary because of existing case law on the common-law offence of misconduct in public office. The problem with that argument, it seems to me, is that Clause 17 expressly abolishes the common-law offence; it is difficult to see how a court would still rely on case law for an offence that has been abolished. Whether this evening or in a letter before Report, I would be grateful if the Minister could give the House clarity on that point. I turn to the other amendments in the group. Amendment 72 from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to include providing misleading information to a news publication under the offence. The intention, obviously, is to improve the quality of public debate and tackle misleading information. Obviously, that is an outcome we would all support, but—it is an important but—there is a balance to be struck. We are concerned that introducing criminal offences in this area may have a chilling effect on public debate. We do not want to endanger high-quality, free debate in the public square. These Benches seek to encourage a public square that is vibrant, robust and may even be raucous, but that is important in a parliamentary democracy. That point was made eloquently by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton, who is a passionate and principled campaigner for free speech, and I have a great deal of—
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. I am concerned that the amendment I have put down is being seen the other way round: that it is stifling free debate with what the press say. It is not coming from that angle at all. It is coming from the perspective of the honesty of public officials, rather than suppressing freedom of speech out there.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I tried to make it clear that, obviously, we agree with the intentions underlying the amendment. It is the effect the amendment will have in practice that we are concerned about, because there is a balance to be struck here. We do not want to leave it, as my noble friend Lord Young of Acton says, to explanatory notes. When I heard that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, agreed with the thrust and perhaps even the wording of the amendment of my noble friend, it seemed to me that a Minister faced with an amendment with the support of them both is facing a very powerful argument. Amendment 77, again from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton—
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I hope I made it clear that it was only the wording of the amendment with which I agreed, not the thrust of speech by the noble Lord, Lord Young.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The noble Lord absolutely did. I was picking the positive bits to try to put the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in the best light possible. I was going to be much more supportive of Amendment 77 from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which is, with respect, a good probing amendment on the exception for those working for news outlets. It is particularly relevant in light of this weekend’s news that civil servants were seconded to the BBC fact-checking services. That was described by some as a clear conflict of interest. I can see how that risks undermining public trust in our national broadcaster. I invite the Minister to reflect on the importance of trust in our news outlets when he replies to Amendment 77, and to say what steps Ministers are taking to prevent apparent conflict of interests arising in the future. I turn to the Question that Clause 12 stand part of the Bill, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner. This is a view, as they have said, which has been echoed by the Policy Exchange paper Legislating for Candour? on what the Hillsborough law is likely to do in government. Again, in his absence, in the previous group the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, was not particularly complimentary about the paper. I am afraid I take entirely the opposite view; I think the paper makes a number of extremely persuasive points. With a foreword from noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, who has probably forgotten more about public administration than most of the rest of us will ever know, and whether one agrees with the conclusions or not, it is a very important contribution to the debate and I am sure that the Minister and his team will have looked at it. Like the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I think a few of the words in the criminal offence are vague in the extreme. We have looked at “obfuscation”. Obfuscation might have been invented by lawyers to ensure that even the accusation of being unclear is itself unclear. I think it was Lord Armstrong who used the phrase “being economical with the actualité”, which was a fantastically obfuscatory way of saying what he was intending to say. Therefore, I agree respectfully with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, that the words here need to be looked at carefully. It is not just “obfuscation”; we need to look at “repeated”. In most political interviews today, the politician says the same thing about seven times. Even in a single interview, you are going to satisfy “repeated”. On the word “significant”, what does it mean? When you see it in an Act, you wonder if it means “very substantial” or merely “not insignificant”. If it means the latter, it is a very low bar indeed. So, all those words need careful scrutiny. Again, I look forward to the Minister’s response on that. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, Clause 12 is not covered by the manifesto commitment. I will just say a further word about this. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, made a very important point about his Amendment 75; he said that it is a stand-alone offence, because it would be an offence even if there is no offence by the principal. He did accept—and was right to do so—that the normal principles of aiding and abetting would still apply. There is a real concern here because we are going to have this problem, I fear. Clause 12 could change the relationship between Ministers and civil servants. For example, a civil servant might say, “Minister, I think if you give the speech you want me to draft, you will be making a misleading statement to the public. I am not going to work on that speech because if you give it, you will be committing a criminal offence and I might be guilty of aiding and abetting a criminal offence”. Of course, the civil servant would explain their refusal as a principled objection to aiding and abetting the criminal offence but, in practice, there are various pressure groups who may put pressure on civil servants to take that view, or civil servants have their own political views. They are human beings; they may take a certain view due to their own political stance. I am not making this up out of thin air. Under the previous Government, there were issues of civil servants saying that they did not want to work on particular policies because they might breach international law. But the Minister is not personally liable under international law, and the civil servant is certainly not personally liable under international law, yet they were raising this as a reason to not work on the policy. I appreciate that this is a somewhat nuanced point, and it may be something the Minister does not want to reply to this evening, especially given the hour. However, I invite the Minister to think about it carefully and would be grateful if he would consider writing to the Committee between now and Report. I am conscious of the time, and I am also conscious that the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, raised two points about the defence—changing “reasonable excuse” to “public interest” and changing the burden of proof. I was going to reply to those points in the next group, and I was wondering whether the noble Baroness, without any disrespect, would permit me to? As she said, they come in both groups and I have already spoken for long enough on this group.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, pointed out the agreement between the noble Lords, Lord Young and Lord Marks; unfortunately, there were many issues on which noble Lords did not agree, so if the Government were seeking a consensus across the House, it does not seem to be available for this set of amendments. However, I take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, made, which is that this is precisely why we have Committee: to get into some of these nuances which might appear contradictory but on further discussion we will perhaps get somewhere. This offence applies to public officials and public authorities on the basis that those entrusted by the public to positions of authority must not wrongly mislead the public. That is the whole point. We think it is right that they are held to a particularly high standard and should take responsibility for statements they make to the public. We do not think it is appropriate to extend this offence to private individuals or bodies. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, we are not saying that every public official is lying, but we are saying that we have expectations, as I have set out. However, a person who is not a public authority or official could commit an offence if they intend to, or believe that their actions will encourage or assist a public official or authority to, commit the misleading the public offence—which is, I think, what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, was driving at. I can reassure the noble Baroness that the offence of misleading the public already captures misleading the public through the media, provided that such an act meets the threshold for the scope of the offence. However, the Bill has been carefully constructed so that the journalist reporting on that misleading information—and this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Young—is exempt, to ensure that the offence does not impinge on press freedom or existing regimes for media regulation. I hope that provides the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, with some reassurance.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and I met over the summer, and I promised when we met that the Government would look closely at Amendment 74. Following careful consideration, we believe that a civil servant misleading a Minister would be capable of being captured by the new seriously improper acts offence in Clause 13. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, predicted that that would be my answer, and indeed it is.
As with the current common law misconduct in public office offence, which the Bill replaces, the seriously improper acts offence is designed to capture behaviour where any public officeholder abuses their office or neglects to perform their duties in the most egregious way. For this purpose, public officeholder is defined in the list in Schedule 4 to the Bill and includes civil servants, MPs and Ministers, among others. This could therefore include instances of civil servants misleading a Minister by virtue of their position, as long as the other conditions of the offence are met, including that they do so for the purposes of obtaining a benefit or causing another to suffer a detriment. Benefit and detriment are deliberately given very wide meanings under this offence. A public officeholder’s intent or purpose in acting is also central to the offence being made out, and this is important to ensure that those who act innocently are not criminalised.
Finally, a jury would also need to be sure that the civil servant knew or ought to have known that their actions or intended actions were seriously improper. It is an important principle of criminal law to avoid unnecessary or duplicative offences, as these can risk creating confusion for those enforcing or prosecuting the law.
Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, the offence of misleading the public has a reasonable excuse defence. The defendant will have the evidential burden to raise the reasonable excuse defence, and the prosecution is required to prove beyond all reasonable doubt—as, of course, she knows—that the defence is not applicable. We chose this approach as it is a common formulation of defences against criminal offences, maintaining strict adherence to the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. We do, however, recognise the noble Baroness’s concerns, and I will take away her proposal for further consideration.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 78 would replace the reasonable excuse defence for the offence with a narrower public interest defence. While acting in the public interest could be the basis of a defence, we think that, for a new offence of this kind, covering as it does all statements made by Ministers and public officials on a wide range of matters, it is important to retain the breadth of a reasonable excuse defence.
The noble Lord, Lord Young, raised a very important point and one the Government is very conscious of: the offence is not intended to restrict free and healthy political or public debate. I hear what has been said about the chilling effects and so on, but others have taken other views. Ministers and others must be able to contribute to free debate for the health of our democracy, as a number of noble Lords have said. We have crafted the offence carefully with that in mind. For an offence to have been committed, an authority or official must have acted with the intention to mislead the public or have been reckless as to whether their actions would do so. By reckless, we mean a person acting with the knowledge that there is a risk that they might mislead the public and taking that risk without reasonable justification. We had a discussion about recklessness last time. I have set that out now. It does not include accidental mistakes or inaccuracies.
The person must also have known or ought to have known that their act is seriously improper, and the minimum conditions for this are that the act involved significant or repeated dishonesty about matters of significant concern to the public. We had some examples of those earlier from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is not in her place. The act must have caused, or had the potential to cause, harm; and, crucially, the act must have departed significantly from what would have been expected of that person in carrying out their functions. Taking these tests together, we are clear that someone expressing an honest opinion or making a contribution in good faith to a debate would not be captured. I hope that satisfies the noble Lord.
Finally, I turn to the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to Clause 12 standing part of the Bill. Let me address briefly why the Government consider that the clause should remain part of the Bill. The offence is triable either way and carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment, reflecting the seriousness of the misconduct at which it is directed, which is the whole basis of the Bill. The clause also excludes acts done for the purposes of journalism. This reflects the Government’s view that news broadcasters, who might otherwise fall within scope, are not culpable when reporting information for the purposes of journalism. This ensures that responsibility remains with those who mislead the press, rather than with the press for reporting that information.
We do not agree that the tests for the offence are vague. Necessarily, they have to be general enough that they can apply in a broad range of scenarios, but together, rightly, they amount to a high threshold for a prosecution to meet. A prosecutor would need to establish that an authority official acted with the intention of misleading the public or were reckless as to whether their act would do so. “Reckless” here means that they foresaw a risk and took it anyway, without a reasonable excuse. The prosecutor would then need to establish that the authority or official knew or ought to know that their acts were seriously improper. The Bill sets three conditions that must be met:
“that the act … involved dishonesty that was significant or repeated … in respect of matters of significant concern to the public … caused, or contributed to causing, harm to one or more other persons, or had the potential to do so, and … departed significantly from what is to be expected in the proper exercise of the person’s functions as a public authority or public official”.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I am grateful to the Minister and I am mindful of the hour. The Minister speaks of a high threshold and says that this offence is intended to catch only public officials who neglect to perform their duties in the most egregious way. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and I pointed out, the central element of the offence—dishonesty—can be made out by repeated, insignificant obfuscations. That seems a little difficult to reconcile with what the Minister is saying. Would he be prepared to think again about the content of Clause 12(3)(a) before we get to Report and have to vote it all out?
Lord Lemos (Lab)
The answer to that question is yes. I am very happy to debate with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others who are interested, particularly on the point about obfuscation; I was just about to say that. The Government’s view is that the policy objective underpinning this clause remains both necessary and proportionate. The offences have been carefully drafted, incorporate a high threshold and contain a number of important safeguards and defences. The Government do not consider that existing mechanisms alone adequately address this type of conduct. Ultimately, the question before the Committee is whether this provision should remain part of the Bill. For the reasons I have outlined, the Government consider that it should. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
From his notes, the Minister has very thoroughly answered the various points about the elements in the offence, which he describes as a high threshold, but he did not deal with any of the points that were made about the potential chilling effect, the effect on how public administration will work in practice and the effect that the possibility of prosecution might have on very many—he has not answered my question about how many—public officials, and how they might view that possibility. Does he have a view on that?
Lord Lemos (Lab)
I think I set out in what I said about the threshold why we thought this would not have a chilling effect; that was the whole point of my peroration about the high threshold. The noble Lord may not accept that, but that is the point I was making. The chilling effect will be, to some extent, protected by the thresholds for prosecution. On the question of numbers, I think the noble Lord said there were 6 million civil servants. As yet, there are not 6 million civil servants, or anything like it. The numbers of public officials are perhaps something we can come back to.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the wide-ranging debate we have had in the last hour and a bit. The hour is late, so I will not go through any of the details. Suffice it to say that the House has asked the Minister to engage on various points between Committee and Report, for which we are all particularly grateful. I hope we can move forward in the spirit of the Bill and recognise that there are times when we will need to make sure that officials cannot deliberately mislead and lie. I know that some of that debate happened in earlier groups tonight; none the less, given that we will come back to this on Report in due course, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 72 withdrawn.
Amendments 73 to 80 not moved.
Clause 12 agreed.
Schedule 3 agreed.
House resumed.
House adjourned at 10.26 pm.
Source: UK Parliament Hansard API. Debate ID: 5419459.