Contribution
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 78 and 79 in my name. These amendments concern the defence to the new offence of misleading the public created by Clause 12, and they should be considered together with Amendments 85, 86, 88 and 89, which fall within the next group, because they raise the same issues in relation to the offences created by Clauses 13 and 14.
These amendments matter because they determine whether these new offences provide an effective means of enforcing accountability, or whether in practice they may prove so difficult to enforce that they prove to be nothing more than a paper tiger. My amendments propose two changes in relation to all three of the new offences. First, they replace the defence of “reasonable excuse” with a defence that the defendant was acting in the public interest. Secondly, they place the burden on the defendant to establish the defence. The starting point is that all three of these new offences are serious ones. Two of the three replace the old common-law offence of misconduct in public office, and all three are directed at conduct that undermines confidence in public administration and erodes trust in those who hold public office.
If Parliament is creating offences of this kind, the defence should be clear, objective and appropriately limited. The first question, then, is: why is “public interest” a better option than “reasonable excuse”? The concern is that the defence of reasonable excuse risks being both too broad in scope and too uncertain in its application. When the Law Commission recommended the abolition of the common-law offence of misconduct in public office, it recommended a public interest defence, not a reasonable excuse defence. The distinction is important. A public interest defence asks not merely whether the officeholder can explain their actions, but whether those actions were genuinely justified in the interest of the public whom they serve. A person may well believe that their conduct was administratively convenient, politically expedient or justified because it protected their institution, whether that institution be the Civil Service, the police or the security services. But none of those things necessarily means that what they did was in the public interest.
I suggest that it is self-evident that most public officials who commit these kinds of crimes do not set out deliberately to commit an offence. They may believe that they are being pragmatic, that they are protecting their organisation, or that they are responding to straitened finances or other difficult circumstances. In their own minds, they may think that what they have done is entirely reasonable—but that does not help the victims, and that is not the same thing as acting in the public interest.
Imagine a prison governor who decides to reduce the number of suicide watches to save money. The governor may argue that financial pressures provided a reasonable excuse for that decision, and in order to decide whether that is right, a jury would have to consider arguments about competing priorities, budgets, judgments and so on. A public interest defence asks a much clearer question: was it truly in the public interest to expose vulnerable prisoners to greater risk to save money? Which question do your Lordships believe victims and survivors whose experiences provide the impetus for this Bill would think is more important?
A public interest defence is not unusual. There are many other examples to be found in the criminal law. For example, Section 4 of the Obscene Publications Act contains a defence that publication of the article in question was justified as being for the public good. In the context of all three offences created by this Bill, a public interest defence would continue to safeguard those who require protection, particularly whistleblowers acting to expose wrongdoing. What it would not do is permit broad and subjective explanations to be advanced for conduct that has fallen below the standard that society requires of a public officer.
That brings me to the second issue: who should bear the burden of proof? This was explicitly considered by the Law Commission, which considered that doing this—putting the burden on the prosecution—could create significant practical difficulties in proving these offences. In many cases, the facts underlying the defence will be known mainly, or possibly exclusively, by the defendant. They may wish to say that they acted on particular information, received particular advice, held a particular belief or were motivated by a particular public interest concern, yet it would be for the prosecution to disprove those assertions. The Law Commission specifically cautioned against this. It considered that requiring the prosecution to disprove such matters could impose unrealistic evidential burdens and, in some cases, require prosecutors to prove the non-existence of facts.
These amendments address that problem in a straightforward and proportionate way. If a defendant wishes to rely upon the defence that they acted in the public interest, the burden of establishing it would fall on them, but only to the civil standard. This is not unusual, nor is it unfair. It is not unfair because the prosecution would still have to prove every element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence remains intact. The Law Commission concluded that such an approach would be compatible with Article 6 of the European convention. It is not unusual because Parliament frequently adopts this approach where the relevant facts are particularly within the defendant’s knowledge. For example, a person charged with possessing a bladed article in a public place must prove that they had good reason or lawful authority for having it. The burden is on them because only they will know why they had the knife with them. There are many other examples, including the defences created by the Bribery Act, which put the burden of proof on the defendant.
The comparison with the Bribery Act exposes another oddity about these defences. Clause 12(6)(a), which mirrors Section 13 of the Bribery Act, places the burden of proof on the defendant, yet Clause 12(6)(b) places the burden on the prosecution. No explanation has been given for why two statutory defences appearing side by side in the same clause have different burdens of proof. The Government ought to explain to victims and the wider public why they have chosen a route that the Law Commission explicitly rejected as making these offences too difficult to enforce. The Explanatory Notes say that its provisions are in line with the Law Commission’s recommendations; that is simply not correct in relation to these defences. This matters because we need to be sure that these defences are capable of practical enforcement. Victims and survivors deserve no less.