B

Baroness Levitt (Lab)

Speaking in the House of Lords on 21 October 2026

Debate

Public Office (Accountability) Bill

Contribution

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in the group, and I begin with my Amendment 93. It is a modest amendment, but it addresses what I believe to be an important gap in the Bill. Its purpose is straightforward: to ensure that the new offences of seriously improper conduct and breaches of duty apply to paramedics responding to emergency calls, in the same way as they apply to other public officials. My concerns about this issue go back many years to a case that came before the Court of Appeal, in which I appeared for the prosecution. The court was presided over by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, who I am sorry to see is not in his place. The issue was whether a paramedic responding to an emergency was a public officer for the purposes of the common-law offence of misconduct in public office. The court concluded that a paramedic did not come within that definition. As a consequence, the conviction could not be upheld. I do not criticise that decision; the court applied the common law as it was bound to do. However, this Bill abolishes the old common-law offence and replaces it with a statutory scheme. In doing so, Parliament has the opportunity to reconsider whether that outcome remains the right one. The deeply troubling facts of that case illustrate why it matters. CCTV footage from the back of an ambulance showed a paramedic engaging in serious sexual misconduct towards a vulnerable female patient while transporting her to hospital. Because of evidential difficulties, the Crown Prosecution Service did not consider that it could prosecute under the Sexual Offences Act. I do not know anyone who thinks that that kind of behaviour is okay or that it should fall outside the criminal law altogether. The reason is obvious: when a paramedic responds to an emergency, members of the public are often at their most vulnerable. They may be injured, unconscious, frightened or otherwise incapable of protecting themselves. Just as significantly, they have no meaningful choice over who attends to them. That is what distinguishes a paramedic from any other healthcare professionals. A patient can change their GP, but when an ambulance arrives at the scene of a serious road accident, the patient cannot simply choose another paramedic; they must place their trust in whoever has arrived to help them. It is precisely because the public have no choice that the duty owed by a paramedic responding to an emergency is such a profound one, yet paramedics are not included within Schedule 4. The consequence is not merely theoretical. If behaviour of the sort I have described were to occur again, a prosecution under Clause 13 for serious improper conduct would still not be possible, nor is that the only difficulty. It also affects the new offence created by Clause 14, namely breaches of duty to prevent death or serious injury. If there is one category of professional whose daily work involves preventing death or serious injury, it is a paramedic responding to an emergency call. Let us suppose that a paramedic deliberately withheld appropriate treatment because of prejudice towards a patient on grounds of race. As matters presently stand, they could not be prosecuted. As I understand it—again, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for meeting me to discuss this—the Government’s explanation for not including paramedics is that they were not covered by the old common-law offence, and therefore this has not been carried over into the new offences. With respect to my noble friend, that approach misses a valuable opportunity. The purpose of this legislation should not be simply to replicate what has happened under the old law. The whole reason for replacing the common-law offence is to create a modern framework of public accountability. The need for modernisation is the very reason that the common-law offence is being abolished, and we in Parliament are deciding who the law should hold accountable now and for the future. If one were to ask an ordinary member of the public whether a paramedic responding to a 999 call exercises public power and occupies a position of public trust, I suspect that the answer would be unequivocal. When a uniformed paramedic enters a stranger’s home in the middle of the night, when a patient is unconscious, terrified or incapable of making decisions for themselves, when intimate physical contact has to take place because a medical emergency requires it, when the decisions taken may determine whether somebody lives or dies, it is difficult to imagine a clearer example of public trust being placed in an individual. There is also a wider point about vulnerability. The Bill is not concerned simply with the exercise of authority but with the abuse of position. Few relationships involve a greater imbalance of power than that between an emergency responder and a patient in acute distress. A paramedic who arrives enjoys immediate and unquestioned trust. We expect that trust to be respected, and we expect accountability if it is abused. Of course, paramedics are subject to professional regulation, but professional discipline and criminal liability serve different purposes. Professional regulation is about fitness to practise. The criminal law is concerned with the protection of the public and society’s condemnation of serious wrongdoing. They are complementary; they are not alternatives. Most paramedics perform an extraordinarily difficult role with skill, compassion and professionalism, and I pay tribute to them. This amendment is not directed at the many, it is directed at that rare bad apple whose conduct brings the profession into disrepute and places vulnerable members of the public at risk. I therefore hope that before Report, the Government might be willing to look again at this issue. If, having done so, my noble friend remains unpersuaded, I would be grateful to hear more about the reasoning behind that position, but I hope there may yet be an opportunity to reach a common view that reflects both the realities of modern public service and the expectations of those whom those public servants exist to protect. I turn very briefly to Amendments 86, 88 and 89 in my name and Amendment 85 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to which I have added my name. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has said, they all concern the defences available to these new offences. I do not intend to repeat what I said on Monday. I suggest that there are strong arguments for the approach suggested by the Law Commission and that it would be neither unfair nor unusual to adopt them. I listened carefully to my noble friend the Minister’s response to what I said on a previous group, and I say very gently to him—for whom I have the greatest of respect—that in relation to Clauses 13 and 14, his answer cannot be the same, as these are not new offences. After all, they replace the common-law offence of misconduct in public office. That is why the Government really ought to explain more fully why they have chosen to depart from the considered recommendations of the Law Commission. If the Government now propose a different course, Parliament is entitled to know why. It matters because the approach adopted by the Bill will make it more difficult to prosecute public officials who have behaved in a criminally bad way. Victims and survivors whose confidence in public institutions has too often already been shaken deserve a clear and convincing explanation for that change of approach. If the Government consider that a different approach is justified, it would be helpful to understand the basis of that conclusion but, if not, I hope the Government will reflect further and think again.

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