Contribution
My Amendments 321, 322 and 323 will occupy the rest of my remarks.
Amendment 321 would establish a long-term rolling stock leasing framework with a presumption in favour of longer lease terms and greater consideration of whole-life costs. Amendment 322 would require GBR to publish a rolling 15-year pipeline of infrastructure and rolling stock works, including renewals, enhancements, signalling, major station works, and rolling stock procurement and refurbishment. Amendment 323 would require a 15-year rolling stock investment framework, setting out future requirements for new trains, refurbishments, decarbonisation and accessibility, as well as, importantly, the opportunities for continued private investment in rolling stock. If these amendments are to exist—that is a matter for the Government to decide—they should be part of an understandable, long-term framework.
These amendments have become even more relevant following the publication of the Government’s Rolling Stock and Infrastructure Strategy on 28 September. We have had only a few weeks to consider that document, and we have certainly not had the opportunity for the detailed parliamentary scrutiny that a strategy of this importance deserves. There are, however, some important questions already.
The first relates to the question of where the pipeline is. The strategy talks about giving the supply chain greater certainty, but it does not itself provide the detailed forward pipeline of procurements that the industry needs. Instead, there will be a fleet and infrastructure plan, which will remain an internal planning tool, and “appropriate information” will subsequently be shared with the market; that is considerably less certainty than my Amendment 322 would provide. In its report, Rail Investment Pipelines: Ending Boom and Bust, the House of Commons Transport Committee found:
“Fluctuating investment increases costs and undermines efficiency”,
whereas a
“steady pipeline … enables suppliers to plan, retain skills and innovate”.
It warned of future “cliff edges” for the rail supply chain and concluded that future investment needs to be
“steady, carefully sequenced and clearly communicated”.
Secondly, the strategy raises—this was mentioned earlier—important questions around who will own the trains. I do not object in principle to the idea that the Government should procure trains. When I was the deputy chairman of Transport for London, I arranged for 1,000 new Routemaster buses—the so-called Boris buses—to be acquired directly by TfL because we could not get an appropriate lease deal. There are times when direct acquisition is appropriate, but it has certain adverse consequences. We, the supply chain and the finance sector need to know. Frankly, it is not responsible of the Secretary of State for Transport to throw out ideas on a political party platform if she is going to make a change. I do not dispute her right to make a change to government procurement policy in this regard, although it has consequences, but this is a ridiculous way of behaving—one that undermines the very sense of certainty and commitment that we all think is so important.
I very much hope that my amendments, which my noble friend Lord Harper spoke in favour of—I am very grateful to him—commend themselves to the Minister. In essence, the Government’s attitude in relation to the Bill is, “We will tell you in good time what is good for you”. We and the Transport Select Committee think that we have some ideas on what is good for the railways. This is one of those ideas: long-term planning; a long-term infrastructure pipeline; and a long-term procurement pipeline, in particular for rolling stock. These things should be right at the heart of the Bill and the Government should be willing to commit to them, or they will leave us in a position where we are constantly being asked to trust them. That is not really how parliamentary democracy works.