Contribution
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, has tabled a regret amendment, but I am going to explain why the House should not share his regrets. I thank my noble friends Lady Carberry of Muswell Hill and Lord Leong.
First, I have to give my apologies, because I am now not able to stay for the other two debates, which I have my name down for this evening, although I think those in the House can probably understand my views on those by reading across from my views on this one. I probably should not be here for this one, but I feel so strongly on this and the other issues before the House this evening that I feel compelled to speak out.
The truth is that I know which side I am on—I am on the side of the worker—and how we all gain, workers and employers alike, from good and effective industrial relations. Essentially, this is what these regulations will right. Getting rid of oppressive anti-trade union legislation is a means to that end.
These regulations deal with a gap in the law that the Supreme Court has already identified. In the Mercer case, Fiona Mercer, a care worker, was suspended as a result of taking part in lawful industrial action. The court found that the existing framework gave workers no protection against detriment short of dismissal for taking part in industrial action. It held that this was incompatible with the right to freedom of association under Article 11 of the European convention. That was inserted by the Employment Rights Act last year, and under that Act there is the power to close this gap.
This gap has real consequences, as Ms Mercer’s case is not an isolated one. In the Communication Workers Union’s dispute with Royal Mail in 2022 and 2023, the employer imposed disproportionate disciplinary sanctions, restricted sick pay and reallocated overtime to agency workers. In the RMT’s dispute with Southern Rail between 2016 and 2018, members lost their free travel passes and so did their families and dependants. Their car parking permits were withdrawn, and all their pay was withheld until the passes and permits were returned. Their applications for rest day working were refused. None of these measures was dismissal, and none was unlawful under the law as it stood and stands, but each caused real and material harm.
The effect goes beyond the individuals involved. When workers know they can be penalised in these ways, some of them will decide not to take part in action they are legally entitled to take. The rights exist in law, but in practice they are restricted. This matters for the way disputes are resolved. Industrial action, we all agree, should be the last resort, and most disputes are settled by negotiation and most are settled before any strike takes place. Negotiation—the essential process of achieving agreement—works because both sides know the workers can, in the end, withdraw their labour. If using that right carries penalties, even those short of dismissal, the balance in negotiations moves towards the employer. Perhaps those on the other side of the debate could say whether they think employers should be able to dismiss employees for going on strike, because what is the difference? It is the pressure on the workers that makes the point.
The TUC emphasises that trade unions are essential to rebalance power in the labour market, and these regulations are consistent with that aim. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, waves the spectre of a return to the 1970s. I think we have moved on a long time from there and much of the legislation post that time is already in force.
My noble friend Lady Carberry of Muswell Hill has explained the extensive consultation and the decision not to use a closed list has been explained. The test here, just to emphasise the point, is whether the sole and main purpose of the employer’s action was to penalise workers for taking part in protected industrial action and for exercising their democratic rights, or to prevent or deter them from doing so. Tribunals have much practice in applying that test; it is not new. These regulations are essential to close, in a measured way, the gap that the Supreme Court has already identified.