Contribution
My Lords, I too congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, on securing this important and timely debate. It is a pleasure to follow so many excellent speeches, particularly, as others have noted, the magnificent maiden speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Sarpong.
As others have pointed out, there are two main approaches to removing SPS checks in international trade law. The first is based on equivalence and mutual recognition. It is true that that is the approach the WTO promotes in Article 4 of the SPS agreement, but it is fair to say that the SPS agreement has not been a huge success, for various reasons. It is too complicated to get into them, but there has been very little litigation under Article 4 of the agreement, even during the time when the dispute settlement system was up and running. Perhaps more importantly for present purposes, equivalence and mutual recognition is what we have signed up to in the CPTPP.
The alternative approach, as we have heard, is based on regulatory harmonisation and alignment, which is the EU’s model. At its heart is a single rulebook which applies to all the countries within the bloc. It is fair to say that, within the bloc, the results can be quite impressive: with a single rulebook and no trade checks, trade grows. But it is also the case that the single rulebook that enables the growth of trade within the bloc acts as a protectionist wall vis-à-vis those who are outside.
It is possible, as we have heard, for countries that have agreed to harmonise to choose to trade with third countries on the basis of mutual recognition and equivalence. To some extent, this is what happened between the EU and New Zealand. We are going to do something different: we are going to trade with the EU on the basis of dynamic alignment. We will do so not as a member of the bloc but as a third country, and, quite importantly, one that is now obliged under other agreements to trade on the basis of equivalence and recognition with other states. Paragraph 28 of the common understanding from last December promised that the SPS agreement would include some exceptions to dynamic alignment. I believe a crucial test for the treaty will be the scope and content of these exceptions. In the common understanding, there was no indication that the exceptions were going to be temporary, but we will have to see tomorrow whether that has been maintained.
The main trade policy question for the Government is this: once we have signed up to dynamic alignment with the EU, how will we manage the tension between dynamic alignment and equivalence and mutual recognition, to which we are committed under other agreements? Article 7.9 of the CPTPP requires state parties to proceed on the basis of objective scientific evidence. Under the CPTPP, the precautionary principle is far more limited than under even the WTO, and certainly than under EU law. Under Article 7.8 of the CPTPP, another party may ask us to conduct an equivalence assessment. When that happens, we are obliged to
“recognise the equivalence of a sanitary or phytosanitary measure if the exporting Party objectively demonstrates to the importing Party that the exporting Party’s measure … achieves the same level of protection as the importing Party’s measure”.
We may choose not to recognise, even in that case—that is allowed under the CPTPP—but we must provide the requesting party with a rationale for our decision. If the real decision is that our agreement with the EU does not allow us to accept their import, notwithstanding equivalence of protection, that is not going to be an acceptable rationale under the CPTPP. We would, in effect, be saying that our obligations under another treaty must trump our obligations under that treaty. Simply in terms of treaty law, that cannot work. What could happen next is that we might be sued under the CPTPP. It has rather complex dispute settlement provisions, but there would be a pathway for litigation. If we are found to be not compliant, there could be trade sanctions.
I have a few follow-up questions for the Minister, based on this matter and this interaction. First, how many equivalence determination requests have we received under the CPTPP or other agreements, including the WTO or our bilateral agreements with Australia and New Zealand, and with what outcomes? Secondly, if the United Kingdom finds a CPTPP partner’s measures to be equivalent but cannot permit the import because of our SPS obligations to the EU, how will the Government handle that situation and the potential conflict of obligations between those two treaties? Finally, have the Government assessed whether dynamic alignment under the UK-EU SPS agreement is, in general terms, compatible with our equivalence obligations under these other treaties? If so, will the Government share that assessment with Parliament?